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ABSTRACT
Following Hurricane Katrina, the United States government provided $45 billion in loans and rebuilding funds to
individuals and businesses for the purpose of repairing the damage caused by the hurricane. However, it is not
yet clear what impact this assistance had on small businesses in affected areas. In particular, the role of Small
Business Administration (SBA) loans has yet to be fully examined. Though few doubt the benefits of short-term
and immediate disaster relief, there is some debate on the benefits of SBA loans. Evidence suggests that
receiving business loans may do more harm than good if the loan ultimately increases debt load. In this study we
contribute to the disaster relief literature through completing the first analysis regarding the receipt of SBA loans
after Hurricane Katrina. We find that there are several characteristics which increase the probability of
application for a loan, but there is a set of different characteristics which determine the amount ultimately
received. Further, results indicate that targeting programs for certain groups were unsuccessful in directing loans
to these groups.
1. INTRODUCTION
When Hurricane Katrina hit the Southeastern United
States in August 2005, it became the costliest
hurricane in the history of the country, with more
than $108 billion in damages and over 1,800 lives
lost (Federal Emergency Management Agency
[FEMA], 2013). The recovery effort was similarly
unprecedented: over 13 million Americans donated
money as individuals, the Red Cross provided $2
billion in emergency aid, and, in addition to $75
billion in immediate relief, the United States
government provided $45 billion in loans and
rebuilding funds (FEMA, 2013). However, it is not
yet clear what impact this assistance had on small
businesses in affected areas. In particular, the role
of Small Business Administration (SBA) loans has
yet to be fully examined. Though few doubt the
benefits of short-term and immediate disaster relief,
there is some debate on the benefits of SBA loans.
SBA disaster relief assistance is intended to support
families and businesses through the recovery of losses
that are not otherwise insured. However, evidence
suggests that receiving business loans may do more
harm than good, particularly if the loan ultimately
increases debt load (Alesch, Holly, Mittler, & Nagy,
2001). In this study we investigate the factors which
influence receipt of SBA loans after Hurricane Katrina.
Results indicate that there are several characteristics
which increase the probability of application for a loan,
but there is a set of different characteristics which

determine the amount ultimately received.

With this analysis, we are able to better determine
the role of national and local government in small
business disaster recovery as well as suggest
future strategies for aid distribution to small
businesses.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section Two includes background on the SBA and
its loan program, as well as a brief literature review
on loan receipt after disasters. Sections Three and
Four discuss the methodology implemented and
data used, respectively. Finally, Sections Five and
Six include results and a conclusion.
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The Small Business Act of 1953 created the Small
Business Administration (SBA), with the stated
function to “aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar
as is possible, the interests of small business
concerns.” SBA now provides a number of financial
assistance programs for small businesses which
are designed to help firms meet financing needs.
Most commonly, this is done through loans.
Generally, however, SBA does not make loans
directly to small businesses. Instead, it sets
guidelines for loans, which are then made by its
partners
(including
“lenders,
community
development organizations, and microlending
institutions” [U.S. Small Business Administration,
2013]). Therefore, when a business applies for an
SBA loan, it is actually applying for a commercial
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loan; albeit one that is structured per SBA
requirements, with an SBA guarantee.
Disaster loans are structured somewhat differently,
as they are provided directly from the government.
During disasters, regions are designated as
“declared disaster areas.” These regions are then
potentially eligible for financial assistance from the
SBA. Businesses of any size, most private nonprofit
organizations, and homeowners may apply to the
SBA for a loan after a disaster. Loans are intended
to cover losses not fully protected by insurance.
Three primary loan types exist, including: (1) home
and personal property loans, (2) business physical
disaster loans, and (3) economic injury disaster
loans. The interest rate for such loans is stipulated
to not exceed 4% if it is not possible for the
borrower to acquire credit elsewhere. For
businesses that are able to obtain credit elsewhere,
the interest rate is stipulated to not exceed 8%.
Whether credit is available elsewhere is ultimately
determined by the SBA.
While all business owners in declared disaster
areas are eligible for SBA loans, preferential terms
were designated for certain groups, including
female, minority, and veteran business owners,
following Hurricane Katrina. It is not clear, however,
if these groups ultimately received loans.
Additionally, coastal businesses were also eligible
for a special class of loan, but this impact on
application and receipt is also unclear.
Although SBA loans were available following
Hurricane Katrina, evidence suggests that the
process was largely mismanaged and that many
eligible applicants were rejected. The Associated
Press released a report of SBA data, finding that
55% of homeowners and businesses that applied
for help were turned away. Of 318,953 applications
processed, 175,463 were rejected and 143,490
were approved. Further, of the approved loan
money, only 60% ultimately reached recipients. SBA
officials claim many applicants never accepted the
loans as they found other ways to rebuild. However,
many applicants indicated that applications were
abandoned as the process took too long and was
overly complicated (Weiss, 2010).
Previous literature also suggests that the loan
application processes following disasters is
problematic. Nigg and Tierney (1990) examine
granted loans after the Whitter-Narrows earthquake
of 1987, finding mixed results on characteristics
which lead to loan receipt. Tierney (1995) further
finds that, even when available, as after the 1993
Midwest Floods and the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake, very few eligible parties actually apply
for loans. The United States Government
Accountability Office has undertaken review the

SBA loan procedures, leading to extensive
testimony regarding attempts to modify and improve
the loan process due to shortcomings following
Hurricane Katrina (United States Government
Accountability Office [USGAO], 2010).
Another body of literature has examined the effect
of disaster loans on small businesses. Haynes,
Danes, and Stafford (2011) find that aid does not
play a role in the survival of a firm. Alesch et al.
(2001) find similar results, indicating that if a firm’s
debt load is increased by receipt of a loan, they are
ultimately worse off.
This study contributes to the literature through
determining which characteristics of small
businesses and their owners are associated with
applying for a SBA loan and, ultimately, the receipt
of that disaster loan. We also attempt to investigate
the effect of targeting programs through determining
if certain characteristics of businesses and their
owners are more likely to lead to loan receipt.
3. METHODOLOGY
In estimating the effect of financial aid, we consider
two measures: (1) did the business attempt to apply
for an SBA loan and (2) conditional on application,
what loan amount was received. As these two
questions signify multiple components which
contribute to a single process, we use a doublehurdle model for the analysis. This model allows for
the distinguishing of the determinants of the
participation decision (that is, completing the
application for the loan) from those of the amount of
participation (that is, the amount of the loan
received). This permits separate stochastic
processes for the participation decision, and, later,
the actual consumption decision. Therefore, we
utilize a double-hurdle model, originally modeled by
Cragg (1971).
The double-hurdle model has a participation
equation:

dt = zt’α + ηt

(1)

and a consumption equation:

yt = xt’β + εt

(2)

where dt indicates whether or not the firm applied
for a loan, yt indicates the amount which the firm
received, if a loan application was completed, while
α and β are vectors of parameters, and ηt and εt are
error terms.
In the first stage of the double-hurdle model, the
participation component, a Probit regression mode,l
is estimated, considering whether or not a firm
applied for an SBA loan. Following Moffat (2005), in
this first stage, we only include characteristics of the
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business owner. As participation is an individual,
endogenous decision, only traits of the individual
who makes the decision to apply or not, are
relevant.

owner. As the loan amount received is an
exogenous decision by the SBA, only the relevant
business and demographic characteristics taken
into account during that process are considered.

The second-stage model includes a truncation
estimation procedure and considers the loan
amount received by the firm. In this case, only the
firms who receive a loan are included in the second
stage. Again, following Moffat (2005), this stage
includes characteristics of the firm and the business

Please see Table 1 for a full list of the variables
included in each stage.

Table 1. Variables used in double-hurdle model
Variable

Description

First Hurdle: Did the business apply for an SBA
loan?
gender

= 0 if male, = 1 if
female

education

highest level of education attained

race

= 0 if white, = 1 if non-white
= 0 if no, = 1
if yes

veteran

It is worth noting that several variables are included
in both stages. These include: (1) gender of
business owner, (2) race of business owner, (3)
whether the business owner is a veteran, (4)
whether the business is located along the coast, (5)
experience of business owner, and (6) whether the
business had insurance.
The first four characteristics are given specific
considerations for SBA loans and, therefore, may
play a role in application as well as receipt.
Additionally, the latter two traits play a role
determining if a business receives an SBA loan and
likely also have some role in determining if they
apply at all.

current marital
status
year in which owner began
working in the
business
number of years worked in
industry
= 1 if business operating from residential
area,
= 0 if not

Finally, each stage is run discretely. The first stage
is run using a probit model with errors clustered
based on location. The second stage is run using a
truncated OLS regression in which those who did
not receive a loan are excluded. Errors are again
clustered, based on location.

insurance

= 1 if business had insurance, = 0
if not

past

= 1 if previously suffered disaster, = 0 if not

To conduct our analysis, we use the Small Business
Disaster Recovery Study, which follows 500 small
businesses in the ten southern-most counties of
Mississippi. The dataset includes resilience data
and business characteristics, as well as information
on aid receipt, including disaster assistance, its
perceived importance and source, and detailed data
on the SBA loan process.

married
ownership
experience
home

qual_damage

coast

owner’s qualitative perception of
incurred
damage
= 1 if the business is coastal, = 0 if
not

Second Hurdle: What amount loan did the
business receive?
legal

form of legal ownership

employees

number of employees

insurance

= 1 if business had insurance, = 2 if not

claim

= 1 if claim filed with insurance, = 2 if not

paid

= 1 if claim was paid, = 2 if not

quant_damage
revenue

damage to business, in dollars
revenue tiers, entered as dummy
variables

age

number of years business has existed

gender
race
veteran
experience
coast

= 1 if male, = 2 if female
= 0 if white, = 1 if non-white
= 1 if yes, = 2 if not
number of years worked in industry
= 1 if the business is coastal, = 0 if
not

4. DATA

Eligible businesses were founded before August
2005 and were operating during the period of
Hurricane Katrina in the 10 county areas of interest.
Further, the respondent was determined to be
eligible based on their ownership stake in the
business in the same period. Approximately 500
businesses were determined to be eligible, and we
use the entire sample in our analysis.
5. RESULTS
The results of the double-hurdle model can be
found in Tables 2 and 3, with the first stage in Table
2, and the second stage in Table 3.The results
suggest that there are several characteristics which
increase the probability of application for a loan, but
a set of different characteristics determine the
amount ultimately received.
We begin the discussion with some general
descriptive statistics of the two groups. The entire
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sample includes 499 businesses. Of these, only 153
applied for an SBA loan (the first hurdle); this is just
over 30% of the businesses. Of these 153, only 64
would go on to actually receive a loan (the second
hurdle); of the sample that applied this is about
42%, and of the entire sample it is about 12%.
These descriptive statistics are quite close to the

findings of the literature discussed above, in which
55% of those who applied for a loan were denied.
The first stage of the model considers whether
business owners apply for a loan. Please see Table
2 for the full set of results. The results show that
gender, perceived damage, and location on the
coast increase the probability of applying for a loan,

Table 2. First hurdle, probit results
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

gender

0.291***

0.041

education

0.020

0.015

race

0.068

0.170

veteran

-0.790

0.121

married

-0.039

0.160

ownership

-0.010***

0.003

experience

0.005*

0.003

home

-0.031

0.180

insurance

-0.068***

0.012

past

0.074

0.312

qual_damage

0.235***

0.090

coast

0.036***

0.032

constant
-1.22***
0.097
th
*** is significant at the 99 percent level, ** is significant at the
th
th
95 percent level, and * is significant at the 90 percent level
Table 3. Second hurdle, truncated OLS regression results
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

legal

0.181

0.142

employees

0.038

0.973

claim – business

0.246

0.188

claim – home

-0.411

0.291

paid –business

0.144

0.638

paid – home

-0.972***

0.043

insurance

-1.436

0.973

(log) quant_damage

0.123***

0.032

revenue tier 2

1.673***

0.377

revenue tier 3

1.790***

0.066

revenue tier 4

0.426***

0.158

revenue tier 5

1.037

0.804

business age

0.010***

0.001

gender

0.273

0.440

race

-0.336**

0.140

veteran

0.262

0.565

experience

0.007***

0.001

coast

-0.205

0.172

constant
9.127***
0.317
th
*** is significant at the 99 percent level, ** is significant at the
th
th
95 percent level, and * is significant at the 90 percent level

while number of years the business owner has had
the business and whether the business had
insurance decrease the probability of applying for a
loan. This follows expectations. Women and coastal
businesses were given preferential loan terms by
the SBA which likely increased these groups’
probability of applying for loans. Further, if a
business owner perceived a high amount of
damage, he or she would be more likely to apply for
additional assistance from the SBA. Conversely, if a
business owner had insurance, he or she would be
less likely to require additional support from the
SBA. Finally, if an owner has had his or her
business for many years, he or she may be less
likely to apply for a loan, as, over time, capital has
been accumulated, allowing for liquidity that a
newer business may not have.
The second stage of the model considers the loan
amount which the business received. Please see
Table 3 for the full set of results. The results indicate
that the amount of damage, revenue, age of
business, and industry experience of the owner all
increase loan amount, while a paid insurance claim
and race decrease the loan amount. This generally
follows expectations. Greater damage may signify
greater need and will increase the amount of loan
received. Additionally, age of the business, revenue,
and industry experience of the owner signify
stability and the ability to repay the loan which may
therefore increase the amount granted. A paid
insurance claim decreases the amount received, as
this suggests that some amount of the damage has
already been covered. Finally, nonwhite business
owners receive lower loan amounts.
Together, these results suggest that the traits which
encourage a business owner to apply for a loan are
different from those which ultimately result in receipt
of a loan. Applying for a loan is increased in
probability by a variety of demographic, location,
and economic factors, while actual receipt of a loan
has far more emphasis on economic and stability
traits.
6. CONCLUSION
The results of our analysis suggest that the traits
which encourage a business owner to apply for a
loan are different from those which ultimately result
in its receipt. Being female, greater perceived
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damage, and coastal locations increase the
probability of applying for a loan, while number of
years the business owner has had the business and
whether the business had insurance decrease the
probability of applying for a loan. However, receipt
of a loan is increased by the amount of damage,
business revenue, age of business, being white,
and industry experience of the owner, while a paid
insurance claim decreases the loan amount.
Overall, these results suggest that business
characteristics generally increase loan receipt, while
owner characteristics tend to increase application.
Further, these results suggest that while some of
the targeted programs for the SBA loans,
particularly those for female business owners and
businesses along the coast, may have increased
applications for loans, there is no evidence to
suggest that they impacted future receipt. Further,
other programs, such as those for veterans and
minority business owners, were not significant in
influencing receipt or application. This suggests
some lack of success in targeted SBA loan
programs.
This paper is limited as it only focuses on
application for and receipt of the loan. Future work
may focus on the effect of receipt of a loan, as well
as the effect of receipt of other types of aid.
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